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Abstract
The Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program (EDSP), mandated by the United States Congress in
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, attempts to protect public health from adverse endocrine
effects of synthetic chemical compounds by establishing a new testing regime. But the complexities
and uncertainties of endocrine disruption and its broader regulatory and social context all but
ensure the failure of this policy. This article addresses the issues facing EDSP comprehensively and
in detail, in order to move beyond the current regulatory paradigm and foster discourse on a
positive role for scientists in support of EDSP's end goal: to protect public health.
Introduction
The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) created the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program
(EDSP) to regulate endocrine-disrupting chemicals
(EDCs) as mandated in the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996 (FQPA) and the Safe Drinking Water Amendments
Act of 1996 (SDWAA). Unlike the more easily appreciated
effects of toxic chemicals, EDCs interact with the human
body indirectly by mimicking, blocking, or otherwise dis-
rupting the normal function of hormones. The prolific
study of endocrine disruption has since uncovered many
unconventional and worrisome mechanisms, exposures,
and effects [1]. The goal of EDSP is to:
[D]evelop a screening program, using appropriate validated test
systems and other scientifically relevant  information, to deter-
mine whether certain substances may have an effect in humans
that is similar to an effect produced by a naturally occurring
estrogen, or such other endocrine effects as the [EPA] Admin-
istrator may designate [2].
If such an effect is discovered, "the [EPA] Administrator
shall, as appropriate, take action under such statutory
authority as is available...as is necessary to ensure the pro-
tection of public health" [2].
Unfortunately, due to four complicating factors, EDSP
cannot protect public health. The first complication is
practical considerations. EPA estimates the universe of
potential EDCs numbers more than 87,000 items. Testing
this many chemicals would take an unreasonable invest-
ment of time and resources, but even scientifically priori-
tizing among them is highly problematic. The second
complication is hazard complexity. Establishing relation-
ships between EDCs and health hazards proves very diffi-
cult if not impossible. Endocrine-disrupting action breaks
all the rules and assumptions that have guided toxicology
through the era of modern chemical regulation. Without
these simplifying assumptions, science cannot establish
causation efficiently or with sufficient certainty for regula-
tion. The third complication is exposure complexity.
Determining exposure levels becomes more important
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and more difficult because the low-dose effects of many
EDCs means that low-dose and transient exposure can be
just as or more dangerous than high-dose and prolonged
exposure. Assessments typically discount these ill-defined
exposures, but we can no longer assume them insignifi-
cant. The final complication is regulatory deficiencies.
Although FQPA and SDWAA provided new authority to
test for endocrine disruption, they provided no new
authority for the regulation of EDCs. As a result, multiple
government agencies must manage future test-positive
EDCs under their jurisdiction using fragmentary and
incomplete statutory authorities and different regulatory
standards. This introduces significant confusion to the
institutional and decision-making aspects of the EDSP
regulatory framework.
The EDSP policy design represents revision at the margins
of U.S. chemical regulatory policy, not a radical revision.
EDSP employs the same basic strategy used to regulate car-
cinogenic pesticides or toxic industrial chemicals – scien-
tifically proving harm prior to regulating a chemical. Two
important aspects of this strategy include an epistemolog-
ical assumption that science has the capacity to 'prove'
harm under the relevant scientific and legal standards, and
an ethical position that prioritizes profit over human
health by placing the burden of proof on public and envi-
ronmental health advocates. These assumptions remain
all but unchallenged in the U.S. context, and thus com-
prise a paradigm. While this paradigm has faced some cri-
tique in the context of carcinogenic pesticides and toxic
industrial chemicals, questions of its efficacy remain unre-
solved. Because EDCs present new and fundamental diffi-
culties for the science underlying the regulatory paradigm,
a critical analysis of EDSP provides a more compelling
case that the current chemical regulatory paradigm is in
need of radical revision.
This study investigates the policy design of EDSP and its
broader context. The above four complications play vary-
ing roles in each stage of the EDSP policy design as dis-
cussed below. See figure 1 for a diagram roughly depicting
the relationship between the four complications and the
policy stages of EDSP. After considering the complications
of each policy stage, this study briefly discusses the role of
politics in regulation before considering the implications
for the conventional chemical regulatory paradigm and a
positive role for scientists in support of EDSP's end goal to
protect public health.
The following discussion provides a comprehensive
empirical basis for considering alternatives to the status
quo. This study aims to integrate the many factors condi-
tioning the failure of EDSP for the purpose of fostering
constructive discussion on U.S. regulatory policy concern-
ing EDCs and chemicals more generally. The author does
not possess a unique answer to the many and complicated
issues surrounding endocrine disruption and the U.S.
chemical regulatory paradigm. Given that no simple, well-
developed alternatives exist that merit immediate consid-
eration by decision-makers, it stands to reason that more
creative and open discussions of EDCs, the chemical reg-
ulatory paradigm, and possible roles for the scientific
community may provide long-term payoffs in public and
environmental health protection well worth our atten-
tions today.
Discussion
The design of EDSP consists of three main stages: priority
setting, screening and testing, and a risk analysis leading
to potential regulation. The complications shown in fig-
ure 1 and detailed throughout this study undermine each
of these stages. Before dealing explicitly with these policy
stages, however, some practical considerations deserve
note. EPA estimates 87,000 chemicals require testing as
potential EDCs, including pesticide chemicals, non-pesti-
cide commercial chemicals, cosmetic ingredients, food
additives, nutritional supplements, mixtures, and envi-
ronmental contaminants [3,4]. This sets a daunting task;
no U.S. chemical regulatory program has ever successfully
tested so many chemicals. A quote from U.S. Congress-
man Mike Synar (D-OK), during a committee hearing on
EDSP complications and policy stages relationship Figure 1
EDSP complications and policy stages relationship
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the safety of pesticides in foods states the problem dra-
matically: "Almost 20,000 pesticide products have been
under review since 1972 and only 31 have been re-regis-
tered. At this rate it will take us to the year 15,520 A.D. to
complete. I believe in good science. What I don't believe
in is geologic time" [5]. Other researchers and watchdogs
note the failure of other U.S. chemical regulatory pro-
grams to effectively gather information or protect public
health (e.g. TSCA [6,7], and FQPA [8]; for a broader cri-
tique [9,10]). By applying Congressman Synar's analysis
to endocrine-disrupting chemicals, we can expect charac-
terization of all potential EDCs to take 59,000 years. EPA
stated: "Testing of all of these chemicals cannot be sup-
ported at the same time because, even if EPA and industry
had the resources to do so, there are not enough laborato-
ries or other facilities capable of conducting the testing"
[11].
In other words, there is reason and precedent to doubt our
ability to accomplish this feat. More importantly, despite
our best efforts to mobilize science in support of this dif-
ficult task, policy mechanisms allow chemical use and
abuse to go forward regardless of scientific results or lack
thereof. "Pesticides are registered for use while important
health and safety data are still being generated; they may
continue to be used after evidence of their hazards is given
to EPA; they may be registered through alternative proc-
esses that bypass important tests; and they may never be
required to be tested for certain kinds of hazards" ([9],
also see [12]). Additionally, politics often plays a greater
role in the decision to regulate than science (see Politics
section below). Politics and policy design play significant
roles in the modern chemical regulatory regime. Hence, a
comprehensive analysis of EDC regulation must take pol-
itics and policy design as well as science into account. The
appropriate standard by which to judge these disparate
policy elements is Congress's mandated end goal: to pro-
tect public health. We will return to this issue.
Priority setting
After EPA sorts chemicals according to statutory consider-
ations, data availability, and qualitative judgment, EPA
decides which of the estimated 87,000 chemicals merit
consideration first through 'priority setting' [13]. The sort-
ing of chemicals into the four categories in figure 2 and
the setting of priorities within 'Category 2' require func-
tionally equivalent information (Note figure 2 disaggre-
gates the policy stages from the right hand column of
figure 1). So priority setting, as used in this article, applies
to both EDSP activities described as sorting and priority
setting (i.e. everything above the dashed line in figure 2).
The Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory
Committee (EDSTAC) defined 'priority' as 'of greatest
concern' in their final report, presumably as determined
by science [14]. EPA, however, added statutory criteria to
the scientific considerations by necessity: "EPA plans to
use three main categories of information to set priorities:
exposure-related information, effects-related information,
and statutory criteria" [15]. Setting aside the chemicals
Congress mandated EPA test (the statutory criteria), how
well can EPA scientifically set priorities among potential
EDCs?
EPA simply cannot set priorities based on science alone.
Almost no data on potential endocrine disruption exists
for the 87,000 prospective EDCs, creating a catch-22 of
needing unavailable information to decide how to gather
information. EPA wants to prioritize which chemicals to
develop data on by examining hazard and exposure data
on those chemicals. In the information poor environment
of endocrine disruption, EPA has no basis to commence
setting priorities. Two methodologies, high-throughput
pre-screening (HTPS) and quantitative structure activity
relationships (QSAR) both discussed below, have
attracted attention and resources due to a general recogni-
tion of this problem. But more important than our current
lack of data, EDCs operate with a high degree of complex-
ity. Because of system complexity, some uncertainty about
endocrine disruption probably cannot be resolved –
resulting in some abiding doubt about the significance of
a chemical as a potential endocrine disruptor. The scien-
tific community and EPA seem quite cognizant of this
complexity, but its relevance for policy and for the end
goal of protecting public health deserves careful attention.
EPA has not realized their ideal of priority setting based
on hazard and exposure information because of the catch-
22 mentioned above. As a result, "EPA's proposed
approach focuses on human exposure-related factors
rather than on a combination of exposure- and [hazard]-
related factors" [16]. While this statement acknowledges
some of the difficulty using scientific information for pri-
ority setting, it is misleading. EPA's current stated policy
prioritizes only pesticide active ingredients and high pro-
duction volume (HPV) pesticidal inerts not because of sci-
entific criteria (hazard- or exposure-related), but for
statutory reasons; Congress specifically mandated testing
of these compounds [2,17]. In fact, the concept of setting
priorities for potential EDCs based only on exposure-
related factors is fundamentally flawed.
To set priorities based on exposure factors alone, one must
assume greater exposure to a chemical implies greater
potential hazard (or some other arbitrary assumption).
For EDCs, this assumption is scientifically insupportable.
The complexity of low-dose effects (discussed in more
detail in the Screening and testing section below) implies
that exposure to some EDCs at extremely dilute doses may
have a greater effect than massive exposure to that same
chemical. Transient or low-concentration EDCs may alsoEnvironmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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pose a greater risk than other high-exposure chemicals.
Low-dose effects and other exposure complexities make
exposure alone a poor proxy for setting priorities. Since
different vulnerabilities and sometimes different health
effects manifest at different developmental stages, any
exposure-only judgment will run into significant difficul-
ties defining spatial and temporal boundaries for expo-
sure determinations. Some short-lived chemicals may
have important endocrine- disrupting effects, but may not
show up in EPA's most robust exposure data sources: bio-
logical sampling and environmental monitoring [15].
Further complexities undermine scientific determinations
of exposure. Maternal metabolism of fat stores containing
bioaccumulated EDCs may lead to practically unidentifi-
able fetal exposure. Some poorly understood exposure
sources, such as flame retardants in clothing and furniture
or phthalates leaching from plastics, would be extremely
EDSP policy design Figure 2
EDSP policy design
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difficult to determine because of the complex social,
cultural, and ecological conditions that affect chemical
release and exposure. Even conventional exposure deter-
minations, such as ingested pesticides, are fundamentally
dependent upon patterns of food consumption. Averag-
ing exposure may obscure vulnerabilities brought on by
complicated cultural, social, and economic patterns of
food consumption and other subpopulation attributes or
behaviors. For example, research has shown significant
differences in the exposure of adults and children to cer-
tain pesticides via residual contamination of fresh and
processed foods [18,19]. FQPA may further obscure expo-
sure determinations through mandates requiring EPA to
assess cumulative exposure, including all exposure routes
and sources, all chemicals with similar modes of action,
and other mixtures of multiple chemicals. The complexity
of endocrine disruption undermines old assumptions
about the relevance of exposure and prevents scientifically
meaningful prioritization on the basis of exposure data
alone.
Understanding this limitation to some degree, EPA con-
tinues to develop and evaluate two methodologies to
include health-effects criteria in the prioritization process.
The first method is high-throughput pre-screening, or
HTPS. This method allows for fast, large-scale testing of
chemicals for interactions with estrogen, androgen, and
now thyroid receptors. HTPS, unfortunately, has flaws as
a means of detecting potential hazard for priority setting.
Most basically, HTPS only tests for hormone receptor
interactions. The possibility of this leading to a systematic
bias against consideration of non-receptor mediated
endocrine disruption is significant. Receptor interaction is
only one means by which a chemical can disrupt the
endocrine system. Interaction with the hormone mole-
cules themselves, stimulation or suppression of hormone
production, and disruption of old hormone metabolism
can all lead to endocrine-disrupting effects as well. HTPS
cannot test for these effects. Other hazard-related short-
comings relevant to HTPS are discussed more thoroughly
in the Screening and testing section of this study. An EPA
feasibility study cited some of the same issues raised here
in declaring HTPS insufficient for regulatory purposes
[20].
A second methodology under development is a computer
modeling technique called quantitative structure activity
relationships, or QSAR. QSAR simulates the behavior of a
chemical based on its structure. EPA would use QSAR to
predict chemical binding with estrogen, androgen, and
thyroid receptors. The dominant criticism of HTPS applies
to QSAR as well – it tests for receptor binding only. How-
ever, the use of computer models will incorporate new
uncertainties via the selection of system boundaries and
functional relationships that may preclude mechanisms
and variables relevant to some endocrine-disrupting
action. While a modeling effort may yield useful knowl-
edge, as a decision-making tool QSAR is wanting. The
inevitable and likely widespread false positive and false
negative results will demand a parallel testing procedure
to establish QSAR's utility for priority setting. But the
drive to develop QSAR derives from an inability to devise
an efficient and reliable testing procedure (like HTPS) in
the first place. While these limitations may or may not be
overcome in time, at present the methodology is not use-
ful for setting priorities. It is instructive, however, to con-
sider the justifications for the development of QSAR.
"Systematic toxicity testing, using conventional toxicology
methodologies, of single chemicals and chemical mix-
tures is highly impractical because of the immense num-
bers of chemicals and chemical mixtures involved and the
limited scientific resources" [21]. QSAR was developed as
an attempt to solve the very problems cited in the Policy
Design section above. Although models can provide much
useful information, they are unlikely to help prioritize
EDCs anytime soon.
Screening and testing
To amass the evidence necessary for regulation, EPA
designed two tiers of scientific assays. Tier 1 screening
involves short-term assays to detect potential chemical
interaction with the endocrine system. Tier 2 testing
involves long-term assays to establish such interactions,
explore more complicated endpoints, and establish dose-
response relationships. If enough data exists, a chemical
can go straight to Tier 2 testing. Otherwise chemicals are
assigned to Tier 1, where chemicals are prioritized and
screened, with all positive results forwarded for Tier 2 test-
ing (see figure 2 for the policy design). "The Tier 2 tests are
longer in duration than Tier 1 tests and are designed to
encompass critical life stages and processes as well as a
broad range of doses, and are intended to be adminis-
trated by a relevant route of exposure" [16]. Although
screening and testing are separate EDSP regulatory stages,
their vulnerabilities to complexity are similar enough to
group them together for purposes of this discussion.
Both screening and testing focus on identifying hazard,
leaving exposure considerations for the final risk assess-
ment. As such, this discussion addresses only hazard-
related complexities and uncertainties. The toxicology of
endocrine disruption is inherently complex in the sense
that scientists must abandon the simplifying assumptions
of standard toxicology. Most notably, we must abandon
the assumption of monotonic dose-response relation-
ships, which assume an increased exposure to a substance
always leads to an increase in effect. Increasing exposure
to some EDCs swamps the endocrine system and prevents
or reduces dysfunction (i.e. an inverted U dose-response,
e.g. [22,23]), while other EDCs exhibit effects at bothEnvironmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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high- and low-doses, but not in between (i.e. a U- or J-
shaped dose-response, e.g. [24]); still others may exhibit
hormesis, whereby a small dose has a beneficial effect
[25,26].
The monotonic assumption allows for statistically signifi-
cant results using smaller sample sizes exposed to higher
doses for shorter periods of time. Linearly scaling these
results down to typical exposure levels presumably yields
approximate quantitative rates of, for example, disease or
cancer. Abandoning this assumption decreases testing
efficiency and multiplies the time and other resources nec-
essary to understand the potential hazard posed by a
chemical. A quote from University of Washington, Seattle
toxicologist David Eaton, states the issue simply: "It's just
too expensive ... you'll never be able to characterize [a
low-dose effect] to the point where people think it's real"
[25]. Non-monotonic dose-responses may also indicate
some unresolvable system complexity. Other standard
toxicological assumptions suffer the same fate as monot-
onic dose-response, for example: the threshold assump-
tion and the assumption that a chemical has a uniform
effect.
Other factors complicate a scientific determination of haz-
ard. Two chemicals can interact in ways that alter their
effects. Some chemicals together inhibit their individual
effects, reducing or preventing an adverse effect where one
is expected. Others simply add their effects together, and
yet others interact synergistically, magnifying the effect
either or both would normally have. "Synergistic interac-
tions are the most problematic, because they indicate that
the effects of multiple chemicals together can be signifi-
cantly more powerful than might be predicted simply by
adding up their effects one at a time. Regulatory science
rarely incorporates any interactions; it is incapable, at
present, of coping with synergies" [27]. Regardless of this
incapacity, EPA seems determined to try and deal with this
complexity: "EPA recognizes that the science of evaluating
mixtures remains complex and unclear, but believes that
it should begin to confront the issues raised by them"
[28]. Additionally, scientists have evidenced possible syn-
ergism between EDCs and infectious disease agents [29].
Synergies with nutrients or poor nutrient levels might also
prove significant (e.g. lead, [30]). These interaction effects
further aggravate the difficulty of determining hazard.
Several studies of the body burden of chemicals in
humans evidence high and diverse concentrations of syn-
thetic chemicals, indicating the importance and likeli-
hood of chemical interactions [31-33].
Another serious complication involves the selection of
testing endpoints, or dysfunctions possibly caused by
EDCs. Some of the dysfunctions already identified
through animal studies include cancer susceptibility and
birth defects, but also more subtle endpoints like immu-
nological dysfunction, suppression of secondary sex char-
acteristics, decreased fertility, increased aggression,
decreased mental capacity and focus, disrupted brain
development, etc [34,35]. While scientists can examine
some of these endpoints relatively easily in human popu-
lations (e.g. cancer incidence), others would be incredibly
difficult to observe, measure, or prove with sufficient sta-
tistical certainty (e.g. feminization of boys or masculiniza-
tion of girls). The difficulty of isolating and measuring
these more subtle effects makes them impractical as regu-
latory endpoints. The inability of scientific testing to
measure such endpoints, however, does not justify their
exclusion from regulatory consideration. Such a policy
would (and in fact does) bias the regulation of chemicals
by exempting the most complicated chemicals and the
most complex health effects from regulatory
consideration.
Risk analysis and regulation
A risk analysis concludes the EDSP policy design. EPA
claims it will use its standard human health risk assess-
ment process for EDCs [36]. Simply put, EPA considers
hazard and exposure data and uncertainties to make regu-
latory decisions (see bottom figure 2 to right of dashed
line). For example, an extremely hazardous chemical asso-
ciated with insignificant exposure probably would not
require regulation while a mildly hazardous chemical
with widespread and pervasive exposure probably would.
Safety factors are built into this process to protect public
health. The standard safety factor for pesticides is 100× to
compensate for uncertainties such as response differences
between humans and the animals studied. FQPA added
an additional 10× safety factor to protect children, but
EPA's uses this additional safety factor inconsistently [8].
Because EPA's risk analysis demands an explicit integra-
tion of hazard and exposure data, the risk assessment itself
is vulnerable to the exposure complexities treated in the
Priority setting section and the hazard complexities treated
in the Screening and testing section. These complexities
include: HAZARD – low-dose effects, mixtures and syner-
gies, and uncertain endpoints; and EXPOSURE – transient
and low-concentration exposure to EDCs, maternal
metabolism of bioaccumulated EDCs, varying vulnerabil-
ity and response by developmental stage, poorly under-
stood exposure sources, vulnerable subpopulations, and
cultural, social, and economic patterns and spatial and
temporal bounds of chemical release and exposure. More
science cannot resolve all of these complexities and
uncertainties.
But these complexities translate into an even more perni-
cious difficulty, as decisions assumed answerable by sci-
ence must be made under conditions of scientificEnvironmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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ambiguity. Ambiguity is related to complexity as follows:
Complexity refers to properties of the system under study,
not the study itself. Such properties include interactive
effects (like synergies), feedback loops, temporal delays
between cause and effect, chaotic or stochastic system
behavior, large numbers of intervening variables, and
inter-individual variations. Uncertainty refers to limita-
tions of the human analysis of a complex system. While
science is often employed 'to reduce uncertainty,' the
complexity of a system sets bounds on the prospective cer-
tainty of informed scientific judgment. For example, fur-
ther science can never remove the chaos from a chaotic
system or the randomness from a stochastic one. And to
illustrate the point, exposure of a fetus to environmental
EDC contamination in utero might easily be a chaotic or
stochastic system. Ambiguity refers to a situation in which
existing scientific data support equally valid but compet-
ing interpretations of risk (see [37] for a discussion of
concepts).
Ambiguity is the single greatest limitation to the use of
endocrine disruption science in policy. While an oft-cited
truism holds that decision-makers can make better deci-
sions with reliable information at hand, this hardly tells
the whole story. Other considerations play into decision-
making, including value tradeoffs, time and resource lim-
itations, and informational constraints, including scien-
tific ambiguity. A National Academy of Sciences report on
endocrine disruption substantiates the ambiguity in this
field:
[I]t became clear as the work of the committee progressed that
the same data could be approached from different viewpoints.
Those different views led to different judgments among the
committee members about the significance of the threat posed
by [EDCs]. In [some] cases, the differences do not reflect the
need for research but reflect differing judgments about the sig-
nificance of information. The differences are not confined to
the members of this committee but are also reflected in the sci-
entific community at large and in the comments received dur-
ing review [35].
The recommendations of this committee amounted to
suggestions for more research. While more research might
be a good thing, such a suggestion provides no guidance
on how to address the more policy-relevant question of
how to make decisions with ambiguous scientific infor-
mation. In a nutshell, more science is not a panacea for all
the problems of risk analysis or decision-making.
This brings us to making decisions about regulation. If a
reasonably certain determination of harm about an EDC
could somehow be made, how would one regulate that
chemical? This discussion of regulation is only tentative
since EPA's Regulatory Activities Workgroup continues to
study the issue. Since EPA has not yet validated any
screening or testing procedures [38], regulation under
EDSP has so far received little attention. Under section
408p of FQPA, EPA must use "such statutory authority as
is available" to protect public health [2] (emphasis added).
In other words, the statutes requiring testing for endocrine
disruption provide no new process by which to regulate
those chemicals – the standards for regulation remain
those of previous regulatory laws. Unfortunately, this
complicates enforcement authority for EDCs.
Regulation must be authorized under one of four laws: the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), or the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The agencies with regulatory
jurisdiction for EPA's list of 87,000 chemicals are: the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) in the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. EDSTAC recommended and EPA adopted the fol-
lowing list of chemicals for endocrine disruptor testing:
75,500 commercial chemicals listed under TSCA, 900 pes-
ticide active ingredients, 2,500 pesticide inert ingredients,
5,000 cosmetic ingredients, 3,000 food additives, an
unspecified number of nutritional substances, and an
unspecified number of natural hormonally active plant
residues [14].
Testing and enforcement authority for this universe of
chemicals is fragmentary. For example, EPA has authority
under FIFRA and FFDCA to set tolerances for pesticides on
food, but enforcement authority falls to FSIS for meat and
poultry products, and FDA for other food items. The
authority is also incomplete. For example, FDA has
authority over the estimated 5,000 cosmetic chemicals,
but FDA has no authority to require any information from
the manufacturer or to mandate product safety testing.
FDA's regulatory authority over cosmetics begins only
after a product (possibly without any safety information)
enters the market. Additionally, the standards by which to
regulate differ. Under TSCA and SDWA the economic
costs of regulation must be balanced against the public
health threat, but under FIFRA and FFDCA, economics
can be considered in only narrowly crafted situations –
the standard is largely health-only based. FFDCA and
FIFRA as amended by FQPA use the "reasonable certainty
of no harm" standard. This standard translates into a 95%
certainty that fewer than one in a million additional can-
cer deaths will occur due to the expected exposure over a
lifetime. No translation specific to EDCs of this standard
is yet available. TSCA, on the other hand, must prevent
"unreasonable risk" of injury to health or the environ-
ment. A risk is "unreasonable" if the risks exceed the ben-Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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efits associated with that activity, including economic
benefits. SDWA explicitly requires a consideration of the
cost of compliance to state, local, and other water systems
when setting safety standards.
The estimated 2,500 pesticide inert ingredients may defy
regulation due to trade secret norms, poor EPA data qual-
ity, and historic government neglect [39,40]. Addition-
ally, no federal statute delegates any authority at all for the
testing or regulation of nutritional supplements. Presum-
ably, endocrine-disrupting nutritional supplements could
be regulated only voluntarily, but the onus of testing
would fall completely upon the executive agency that vol-
unteers to expand its responsibilities. Significant difficul-
ties involving confidential business information,
including proprietary chemicals and chemical mixtures
may further compromise enforcement capability.
The complexity of the institutional and legal landscape
(multiple interacting agencies with multiple overlapping
mandates and authority) creates substantial regulatory
confusion. In this situation, the powers and responsibili-
ties of different government agencies might be interpreted
differently by other agencies or by affected parties. Such
confusion leaves room for interpretation that may require
long delays and intensive court battles to resolve. The his-
tory of TSCA indicates that such confusion (for TSCA, 'bal-
ancing economic cost' with regulations to protect public
health) as well as the menace of legal action can lead to
crippling regulatory inaction [41]. By requiring enforce-
ment under existing statutory authority, FQPA leaves the
regulation of the already complicated universe of EDCs to
a complicated web of regulatory regimes of questionable
efficacy.
Politics
Finally, the role of politics in regulatory decision-making
deserves note. The conventional ideal of regulation under
the current paradigm is that good science leads to an
informed decision-maker who can then remove or limit a
proven hazardous chemical from commerce (or, rarely,
prevent its introduction). The complexities of endocrine
disruption science, practical considerations, and the regu-
latory deficiencies discussed above impose limitations on
this conventional ideal. Neglecting the role of politics in
regulatory decision-making, however, is perhaps this
ideal's most significant omission. A variety of academic
and government research as well as environmental and
public interest group analysis points to the failure of test-
ing regimes to produce significant regulation or protect
public health (e.g. [7,8,10,12,41,42]). In fact, past regula-
tion often addressed specific chemicals by legislative man-
date (e.g. the mandated ban of PCBs in TSCA) or due to
media-promoted public awareness and its resultant outcry
(e.g. the January 1971 court order essentially forcing EPA
Administrator Ruckelshaus to ban DDT). In other words,
politics often leads to regulation regardless of scientific
considerations.
The Alar 'scare' of 1989, when the public and EPA reacted
to evidence that contamination of apples might endanger
child health, provides a visible recent example of this
dynamic. A 60 Minutes show aired on February 26, 1989
[43] dedicated to the findings of a Natural Resources
Defense Council study titled 'Intolerable Risk: Pesticides
in our Children's Food' [18]. The public outcry about Alar
(a.k.a. daminozide) led to a drop in apple sales and
pushed EPA and Alar's manufacturer, Uniroyal Chemical
Company, Inc., to take action [44]. After announcing the
safety of Alar in March 1989, and an intention to take no
action before July 1990 [45], EPA announced a prelimi-
nary determination to eventually cancel all registrations of
daminozide used on foods in May 1989 [46]. A little over
a week later, Uniroyal announced a voluntary recall of all
remaining stocks of Alar, and EPA approved a voluntary
cancellation of all Uniroyal's daminozide registrations
that November [47].
In an attempt to avoid the still bitter battle between Alar
critics and advocates, the relevant point is not whether
Alar is or is not a health hazard, but that politics played a
major if not a dominant role in its regulation. The very
fact that a bitter argument about the actual risk posed by
Alar persists indicates that science does not always play a
definitive role in regulatory decision-making [44,48,49].
But if politics significantly affects decision-making, what
is the role of science? To understand the interplay between
science and regulation, we must critically consider the
conventional assumptions of the modern U.S. chemical
regulatory paradigm.
Conclusions
The conventional paradigm underlying EDSP and most
other U.S. chemical regulation amounts to 'science leads
to regulation;' it assumes a scientific determination of
harm must and, in fact, does precede regulatory action. In
this context, Congress mandated EPA protect public
health from EDCs, but only after "develop[ing] a screen-
ing program, using appropriate validated test systems and
other scientifically relevant information, to determine
[harm]" [2]. Real progress on protecting public health
waits on the development of a scientific testing regime, on
faith that scientific testing is both necessary and sufficient
to protect public health. Practical considerations, hazard
complexity, exposure complexity, and regulatory deficien-
cies all challenge the naivety of this assumption. Rational
analysis of these factors leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that science has limitations within the existing regu-
latory regime and that other important factors are
disregarded by the current paradigm.Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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This criticism does not discount the contributions of sci-
ence, although it seriously questions the assumption that
simply doing more science will protect public health.
Additionally, this argument does not promote unconsid-
ered action, although it does stress the need to make deci-
sions in the face of ambiguous information. The paradigm
itself, though invisible to most adherents, is quite real.
The words and actions of industry and environmental
groups, government agency personnel, members of Con-
gress, and other concerned interests, regardless of their
side of the debate, indicate near universal buy-in to the
'science leads to regulation' paradigm (see [10] for discus-
sion). But the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity of
endocrine disruption and its broader context undermine
this paradigm's simple logic.
The internal validity of 'science leads to regulation' pre-
sumes the capacity of science to prove harm with suffi-
cient certainty to regulate. Exposure complexities,
including transient and low-concentration exposure to
EDCs, maternal metabolism of bioaccumulated EDCs,
varying vulnerability and response by developmental
stage, poorly understood exposure sources, vulnerable
subpopulations, and cultural, social, and economic pat-
terns and spatial and temporal bounds of chemical release
and exposure, place the ability of science to make solid
exposure determinations in significant doubt (see Priority
setting section). Hazard complexities, including low-dose
effects, mixtures and synergies, and uncertain endpoints,
contribute further obstacles to an unambiguous scientific
determination of harm (see Screening and testing section).
Under current policy mechanisms, these complications of
endocrine-disruption science will prevent any meaningful
regulatory action. Essentially, endocrine disruption is too
complex and our science too uncertain; most scientific
information regarding EDCs will remain ambiguous, with
the available information supporting quite different judg-
ments of risk.
Recall this observation by the National Research Council:
"In [some] cases, the differences [in scientific judgments
of EDC significance] do not reflect the need for research
but reflect differing judgments about the significance of
information" [35]. The National Research Council has
also recognized the more general prejudice that hinders
regulation: "The assumption of the null hypothesis as
used in risk analysis [as in the case of regulating chemi-
cals] contains an implicit bias because it places a greater
burden of proof on those who would restrict than those
who would pursue a hazardous activity, presuming these
activities are safe until proven otherwise" [50]. In other
words, the paradigm is biased against regulation, and the
complexity and uncertainty of endocrine disruption will
further undermine attempts to regulate.
The external validity of 'science leads to regulation' must
take into account the broader context of potential endo-
crine disruptor regulation. The regulatory deficiencies
addressed in the Risk analysis and regulation section, the
practical considerations addressed in the Policy Design sec-
tion, and the significant role of politics in regulation dis-
cussed in the Politics  section challenge the arbitrary
constraints the paradigm places on non-scientific factors.
The roles of actors besides the scientific community and
agency scientists can make or break regulation. Further-
more, the legal ambiguity of regulating different chemi-
cals under four statutes with different regulatory standards
and fragmentary, incomplete statutory authority guaran-
tees further difficulty with regulation, even if the science
could meet the near-impossible burden of proof. The
most basic practical considerations, including other U.S.
regulatory precedents, policy mechanisms to avoid regula-
tion, and most importantly, the sheer number of potential
EDCs, each bring the conventional paradigm into doubt.
'Science leads to regulation' simply leaves too much of the
decision-making context out of the picture.
Yet discussions of improving chemical regulation prima-
rily deal with the minutiae of scientific testing regimes.
For example, an Environmental Defense Fund analysis
exposing the utter futility of chemical regulation under
TSCA (based on the U.S. Government's own damning
analysis) came to the conclusion that the failure of testing
in the past means we need to test better in the future
[7,41]. Though better testing might improve things, such
a suggestion still ignores the hard reality of decision-mak-
ing. Scientific information often remains ambiguous and
consistent with quite different action alternatives. Further-
more, scientific information forever remains only one
consideration of the decision maker – economic impact,
resource tradeoffs, political considerations, constituent
needs, and agency funding are other obvious and equally
relevant considerations.
The relevance of science for regulatory decision-making
lies predominantly outside the current trend of increas-
ingly detailed mechanistic investigation of endocrine dis-
ruption. While endocrine disruption science can
contribute much to a decision-maker, it cannot provide
unambiguous information that 'objectively' determines
the correct decision. But science could help guide deci-
sion-making under conditions of ambiguity; uncertainty
does not entail 'anything goes.' On the contrary, the
uncertainty itself might guide decision-making better than
any other factual information. The 2001 Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change reports provide a precedent
in the explicit treatment of uncertainty – the reports indi-
cate the relevance of scientific information for decision
makers by ranking scientific conclusions by Bayesian con-
fidence estimates (e.g. virtually certain means greater thanEnvironmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:2 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/2
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99% confidence, very likely 90–99%, etc) [51]. This
empowers decision makers and the public by contextual-
izing expert knowledge and frees scientists to provide rel-
evant information that has not yet met the rigorous
standards of scientific proof and peer review. Some excel-
lent work extrapolating from this precedent and consider-
ing its ramifications already exists [52,53].
A franker treatment of uncertainty can improve the rele-
vance of science to decision-making and promote realistic
expectations of science and the scientific community.
Such progress might turn the spotlight on more signifi-
cant impediments to regulatory decision-making under
conditions of ambiguity, such as the difficulty of testing
87,000 chemicals and the role of politics and values in
making regulatory decisions. Scientists can take action
within their own communities to support the policy goal
of protecting public health by exploiting and improving
the role scientific information plays in chemical regula-
tion. The possibility that scientists can empower decision
makers and the public by developing community stand-
ards and norms explicitly addressing uncertainty is one
creative idea, but more are needed. The key to progress is
taking an active and creative role in support of the protec-
tion of public health. Waiting for a solution in the form of
national legislation has failed to inspire significant change
over the last several decades. But explicit action within the
scientific community that discourages unrealistic expecta-
tions of science will support long-term progress on chem-
ical regulatory policy and the protection of public health.
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